From protecting to performing privacy by Benjamin, Garfield
The Journal of Sociotechnical Critique 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 1 
May 2020 
From protecting to performing privacy 
Garfield Benjamin 
Solent University, garfield.benjamin@solent.ac.uk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociotechnicalcritique 
 Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Computer Law Commons, Digital 
Communications and Networking Commons, Digital Humanities Commons, Ethics and Political 
Philosophy Commons, Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, Library and Information 
Science Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin, G. (2020). From protecting to performing privacy. Journal of Sociotechnical Critique, 1(1), 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.25779/erx9-hf24 
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in The Journal of Sociotechnical Critique by an authorized editor of ODU Digital Commons. For more 










Privacy is increasingly important in an age of facial recognition technologies, mass 
data collection, and algorithmic decision-making. Yet it persists as a contested 
term, a behavioural paradox, and often fails users in practice. This article critiques 
current methods of thinking privacy in protectionist terms, building on Deleuze's 
conception of the society of control, through its problematic relation to freedom, 
property and power. Instead, a new mode of understanding privacy in terms of 
performativity is provided, drawing on Butler and Sedgwick as well as Cohen and 
Nissenbaum. This new form of privacy is based on identity, consent and collective 
action, a process to be performed individually and together to create new 
structures that instil respect at the heart of our sociotechnical systems. 
 





The prevailing culture of privacy is centred on the assumption that it is 
something that needs to be protected. But this framing has mired privacy 
in fear and helplessness born of protectionist thinking. That is not to say 
that the affective impact of fear cannot be a force for radical change. 
Indeed, Sedgwick’s (2003) performativity stems from affect, a collective 
process of feeling and learning, and thereby action. Critiquing protectionist 
privacy does not erase its importance, but acknowledges its basis as a call 
for change upon which performative conceptions can emerge as a 
constructive and collective contrast. But the privacy paradox shows that 
increased knowledge of threats does not inspire users to better protect 
themselves (Mamonov & Koufaris 2016; Black et al. 2018). Defensive 
perspectives tend towards a sense of inevitability, carried through cultural 
representations in film, literature, games and the press whereby privacy 
becomes a battle already lost to the all-powerful spectres of government, 
business or malicious hackers. And yet, privacy is worth protecting. Or, at 
least, it is worth ensuring users have control over access to their data and 
metadata if and when they want it. Privacy is a temporal and political 
issue, and the harms of new technologies are often distributed unequally 
and visible only in retrospect. How, then, can we support privacy without 
resorting to failed protectionism? There are a series of emerging debates 
and conceptions of privacy that are making progress towards this aim, 
which we here suggest can be best encapsulated as performing privacy. 
 
Writing just before the recent swing back in favour of privacy—in the wake 
of mass surveillance revelations, social media data scandals and 
advances in facial recognition—Cohen found resistance to privacy (in 
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favour of the Silicon Valley rhetoric of innovation or post-9/11 government 
expansion of security powers) to be based on the problem that “legal 
scholarship has conceptualized privacy as a form of protection for the 
liberal self. So characterized, privacy is reactive and ultimately inessential” 
(Cohen, 2013, p. 1905). Cohen moves beyond the liberal self with a 
poststructuralist and social constructivist framework that emphasises the 
importance of performativity in the construction of the relational, 
multivalent, networked self of contemporary privacy (2012, p. 129). 
However, she refuses to endorse any particular theory (p. 147), and her 
use of performativity remains focused on the constructive process of 
identity formation and a deconstructive critique of sharing, rather than the 
constructive and reconstructive relational context in which privacy itself 
might be performed. 
 
Cohen's position acts as a useful basis for positioning the subject(s) of 
privacy amidst the messiness, embeddedness and heterogeneity of 
culture (2012, p. 267). But performativity calls into question not only the 
liberal subject but also the emphasis on autonomy (see, for example, 
Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 2) that underpins legal understandings of 
the subject. Examples such as regulating to enforce value-centred design 
—as the iterative construction of norms—therefore need pushing further 
into elaborating more explicitly performative enactments of privacy as a 
collective practice, moving beyond performative identity and privacy 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 187) towards a performative conception of privacy. In 
order to fully embrace a performative approach, and to collectively apply 
such an approach in practice, we must therefore move beyond asking 
what function privacy performs and instead ask how we can perform 
privacy together. That is the topic of this discussion. 
 
The definition of privacy used in this article expands on Nissenbaum’s 
concept of “contextual integrity” as appropriateness and flow (2004), later 
expanded to include contexts, norms, actors, attributes (types of 
information) and transmission principles (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 129f), 
although to some extent these are all subsumed within both contexts and 
norms. Nissenbaum’s framework offers a negotiation of the specificity and 
interrelatedness of different spheres or contexts and the new cultures that 
emerge therein (Nissenbaum, 2011, p. 38), it is both “heterogeneous and 
thickly integrated with social life” (p. 43). Integrated into all aspects of 
society, privacy cannot be compartmentalised (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 
128), for the flow of information is embedded in any human society 
through all levels of interaction. Contextual Integrity as a concept offers a 
relational and embedded definition of privacy which is usefully extended 
by thinking in terms of performativity, such as emphasising the temporal 










Building on gender theories of the performative and periperformative acts 
that constitute social structures (Butler, 1988, 2015; Sedgwick, 2003; 
Green, 2007) situates privacy simultaneously in the individual and at the 
root of broader systems of power. This article develops a performative 
understanding of privacy in order to move beyond the descriptive-
normative divide, towards thinking privacy as an active process and 
thereby a more relevant framework for collective action. Skinner-
Thompson (2017) explores performative privacy in a legal context, 
emphasising the act by individuals or groups of resisting surveillance in 
public as expressive acts: hoodies and physical masks, online identity 
masking tools, transgender rights, and head veils. An instructive 
development from this legal perspective is that “functional demands for 
privacy may also be viewed as legally-protected speech—as expressive” 
and also as political (p. 1726). This is a useful move towards sharing as a 
part of privacy, transcending the public-private divide, and establishing a 
regulatory basis for performing privacy as empowerment. The approach 
developed here pushes this argument further, beyond performing anti-
surveillance, into a fuller contextual way of thinking that incorporates 
sharing and withholding, subject and audience, individual and collective, 
and interdisciplinarity. Performing privacy requires a simultaneous shift in 
all spheres: law, technology, ethics, politics, economics, and, perhaps 





Protecting privacy is often described as a “losing battle” (Kerry, 2018), yet 
it persists as the focus of debates, particularly in technical and legal 
spheres. This is perhaps an artefact of those specific fields, the need for 
clearly definable terms and requirements for generalisable application and 
enforcement. But society is not uniform, there is no one-privacy-fits-all. By 
thinking solely in terms of technical and legal systems, we risk falling into 
a defensive, protectionist position that fails to empower individual agency 
by placing too much emphasis on broader structures. This escalation is 
where individual circumstances, particularly those of marginalised or 
underrepresented groups, get lost. It is therefore necessary to critique the 
relation of privacy to the existing (often exclusionary) frameworks of 




The most obvious justification for protecting privacy is through its 
understanding in relation to freedom. In his highly influential text on 
privacy and freedom, Westin defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others” (2015 [1967], p. 
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7). This suggests a core understanding of privacy in terms of protecting 
freedom and the “right” to privacy, which is followed through in much legal 
scholarship that tends towards taxonomising these rights (Solove, 2005, 
2008). Such taxonomisation is widespread, although not without 
limitations of contextual specificity and agent relativity (O’Callaghan, 2012, 
pp. 16-17). A necessary protection made all too clear in the aftermath of 
the Snowden revelations is from the state. This is of course an important 
endeavour, and one in which organisations like the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Privacy International, or Liberty Human Rights are essential. 
But beneath this very clear and very real need—particularly for groups 
historically persecuted by state apparatus (Browne, 2015) or to enable the 
ability of journalists and political activists to operate in oppressive states 
(Blum-Dumontet, 2019) - lies a problematic framework that places the 
individual always as victim, as subject to the state’s grace. 
 
Monitoring citizens has long been a function of the state, whether for 
taxation or control. Expecting privacy protections against the state will 
always be a qualified rather than absolute right, always easily traded for 
the interests of the state. This is further complicated by the blurred 
relations of access and privacy. For example, Rød and Weidmann show 
that “regimes aiming to prevent any independent public sphere are more 
likely to introduce the Internet” (2015, p. 338), while states with more 
democratic systems (such as the US or UK) have a tendency to escalate 
surveillance legislation disproportionate to their claims of promoting 
freedom. This suggests that enhanced internet freedom, for example, 
does not necessarily equate to enhanced privacy, building on the inherent 
tension between freedom of information and right to privacy that suggests 
a potential incompatibility with other freedoms. 
 
If protecting privacy freedoms from governments is problematic, what of 
protection from platforms and corporate interests? Structurally, this is to 
some extent impossible. It is tech companies who collect, hold and 
process our information on a daily basis. It is tech companies who 
manage and control the infrastructure and platforms upon which digital 
society operates. If protection of privacy from governments cannot be 
relied upon, as we have seen, then it is also naive to expect protection of 
privacy by governments. Recent developments in the wake of the GDPR 
or the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal have led to a push for 
regulation of big tech, but governments have been slow to act and have 
thus far shown little in the way of meaningfully challenging the dominance 
of major corporations. The underlying structure of freedom and rights in 
online reality is predicated on a fundamental power asymmetry between 
organisations (internet service providers, platforms, hardware 
manufacturers, but also governments) and individuals. 
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Another key area of freedom in which privacy protections must be 
understood is from other individuals and, taken together, society as a 
whole: 
 
Privacy provides the self shelter from the storm; it gives the nascent self the 
breathing space to develop, and the developed self a personal realm to exist as it 
is, free from the prying eyes and corrosive influence of society. (Hill, 2004, pp. 571-
2) 
 
At first glance, this situates privacy as a positive and empowering 
protection. But who decides which influences are deemed corrosive? This 
is particularly problematic when considering privacy from the family. 
Children’s rights to privacy have recently been identified as an overlooked 
issue (Children’s Commissioner for England, 2018), with parents and 
schools (those supposedly there to protect children) often forming part of 
the problem through sharing children’s data on social media, normalising 
passive surveillance in education, or forcing engagement with privacy-
invasive systems. 
 
Privacy within and of the family unit is further problematised in relation to 
gender. Maintaining the privacy of the family home (dating back to 
Aristotle’s public-private divide) has long been an act of concealing abuse, 
particularly of women. While bodily privacy is important for sexual rights 
and empowerment, it can also be used to protect systemic abusers, 
carried forward onto digital devices in the form of (legal) “stalkerware” or 
“spouseware” (Greenberg, 2019). Viewing privacy as protection—as 
freedom, and as the specific rights of a given legal framework—is a 
process of layering, prioritisation and discrimination. Whose freedom 
comes first? Sedgwick notes how performative frameworks and 
periperformative contexts (discussed below) can expose the risks of 
privacy in, for example, the violence of slavery within quasi-familial 
contexts (2003, p. 83). These issues of freedom are of course part of a 
long debate going far beyond privacy, but they call into question the 
justification of privacy as a protection. Thinking privacy in terms of 
protecting freedom will always be disproportionately ineffective for 
marginalised groups, amplifying existing inequalities in societies for which 
equal rights are a mythical ideal rather than an enforceable reality. 
 
Privacy legislation is severely limited in practice. It relies on a patchwork of 
other rights and protections such as disability, genetic or other legislation 
(Horvitz & Mulligan, 2015), and remains “weak, incomplete, and fractured” 
(Bamberger & Mulligan, 2011, p. 249). Current regulation is merely an 
enforced minimum upon which individual organisations must build their 
own privacy framework (often finding legal loopholes, particularly for 
manipulating consent over time). Mulligan and Horvitz (2015) demonstrate 
how privacy can be used to help prevent discrimination by limiting access 
to information that could be used to discriminate (p. 253), but that the 
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same process can hinder the recognition of discriminatory classifications 
subsumed in other identifying pieces of information from which inferences 
generate discrimination (Dwork and Mulligan 2013, p. 37). An example of 
this is Facebook’s differential advertising of real estate not explicitly 
grounded in race but still discriminatory by latching onto associated 
identifiers such as neighbourhood that racially stratify communities in 
practice. 
 
Even the apparent protections of anti-discrimination discourse around bias 
in data and algorithms are often overly instrumental, based on “the liberal 
rubric of rights, opportunities, and material resources” (Hoffmann, 2019, p. 
909) in which privacy is reduced to consumer rights rather than taking into 
account, for example, attacks on dignity. Hoffmann goes on to state that 
privacy is not a “panacea” (p. 910) for bias and data-based harms, but 
broadening the definition of privacy beyond a protectionist viewpoint could 
allow us to better embrace the embeddedness of different social and 
technological principles in how individuals are defined, operationalised, 
and (mis)treated with technology. Escaping the corporate definitions of 
privacy (and consent, discussed below) used for terms and conditions or 
PR stunts is an essential step. This would enable privacy to better support 
the project of addressing broader social inequalities and the pursuit of 
justice for marginalised groups. 
 
But beyond these practical and systemic clashes within privacy, we can 
also ask whether privacy is even conceptually compatible with freedom. 
As Mokrosinska (2018) suggests, “privacy as control over access [...] is 
about normative control involving a moral claim on the part of the agents 
to limit the liberty of anyone else to search for information or to interfere 
with their decisions.” In this understanding of access control—already 
narrowing its usefulness and undermined by, for example, the Right to Be 
Forgotten in which privacy comes into conflict with a host of other rights 
and public interests—privacy is in fact not a freedom but a limit on it. 
Privacy as normative control is an act of closing off, of separation. 
Thinking this way undermines the positive component of privacy and 
contextual integrity as also being concerned with sharing and the building 
of social connections. 
 
Privacy may involve protection (of identity, of consent, of autonomy), but a 
protectionist rhetoric of privacy displaces these other concerns into a 
tradeable right that all too often loses out to grander concerns of the loci of 
power (whether in patriarchal family structures, corporate boards, or 
government agencies). But protecting privacy as a process of individual 
self-defense (Cohen, 2008, p. 201) also fails in the collective implications 
of information leakage or exploitation such as the similarities in genetic 
information of family members, the relational information of one’s contacts 
or communication metadata, or the normalising effects of data en masse 
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as a tool for discrimination. Perhaps this is why privacy has been 
described as “the lost right” (Mills, 2008). Protecting privacy as a freedom 
fails at the limit of those protections, a brittle edge past which marginalised 
individuals and groups are easily abandoned. 
 
Property 
Personal data—and therefore the understanding of privacy—is 
increasingly defined as property. Igo highlights the 1960s as one of the 
“critical episodes” (2018b, p. 3) in which privacy came to be understood in 
terms of property (2018a), alongside the rise of the surveillance society 
(2015), forming a social shift that instigated new legal protections. While 
Igo’s broader history of privacy (2018b) remains US-centric and limited by 
the fallback to problematic legal discourses of autonomy and freedom, it is 
instructive on the two-sided anxieties of privacy. Igo importantly 
emphasises the sociocultural impact and breadth of the language of 
privacy debates, and its embeddedness within society (p. 6). Thinking 
about privacy as property is unhelpful not only when used by companies 
justifying access to data in return for access to services, but also in 
positive attempts to transfer ownership of data back to individuals, offering 
them the choice of whether, to whom and for how much to trade away 
their data. Fundamentally, this does nothing to question the economic 
power structures and access control. The “data is the new oil” rhetoric 
emphasises a transactional approach to privacy that, ultimately, only 
serves private (business) interests. 
 
Zuckerberg’s declaration that “the future is private” (2019) therefore 
highlights an act of encryption-washing that protects privacy from 
government surveillance while making the future of data fully privatised 
under corporate ownership. But data is not even treated as carefully or 
regulated as thoroughly as oil, but the metaphors (alternatives relate to 
water) as a combined force of nature to be tamed and resource to be 
exploited, evoking abundance, volatility and necessity while excluding 
humans (Puschmann & Burgess, 2014; Stark & Hoffmann, 2019). This 
has the further effect of reducing individuals to their expression as 
measurable data points. Hildebrandt builds on the suggestion that “not 
everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can 
be counted (Cameron, 1963, p. 13), to suggest privacy as the “protection 
of the incomputable self” (Hildebrandt, 2019). Nakamura labels this a 
problem of cybertypes as “menu-driven identities” that reduce dynamic 
and expansive categories such as race or gender into minimal options in a 
“clickable box” that erases aspects of identity (2002, pp. 101-102). This is 
particularly the case for those between conventional normative identity 
markers, such as “the experiences of trans people [which] lay bare the 
limits of rigid or fixed data categories for capturing fluid or multifaceted 
identities” (Hoffmann, 2018a, p. 11). This highlights problems with 
empowering the multiple or networked self that Cohen (2012) elaborates, 
7
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as many are left no choice but to conform to (often incorrect) reductionist 
categories for access or representation. 
 
Data as property to be possessed therefore raises the question of 
dispossession, as both the submission (subjection) of the subject to norms 
of recognition (in the performative construction of the subject) and the 
disowning or abjection of subjects by ideological norms (Butler & 
Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 1-2). Athanasiou highlights how “transgender 
suspends the certainties of having versus not having” (p. 55), calling into 
question the notion of gender (and here, by extension, any identity 
markers or data points) as property. The incomputable self, the self 
beyond menu-driven identities, the queer self, and the dispossessed self, 
call into question the very validity of identifying data beyond being a tool 
for political control. Pushing for equality in the application of privacy 
protections must entail an act of resistance towards the underlying system 
of measurement, production and capitalism that limits, for example, 
Zuboff’s (2019) critique of surveillance and misuse of personal data. 
Without changing the power asymmetries of capitalism, corporations will 
always seek to mobilise new technologies for profit. Protecting individual 
data as property does little to combat these cultural dynamics. 
 
Facebook has demonstrated this in court by attempting to argue that their 
users have “no expectation of privacy” (Thalen, 2019). This shows a 
conflation of two different expectations: being in public socially and having 
one’s data exploited by a company. And yet the justification had already 
been used in a Canadian court against an individual claiming a breach of 
privacy (Zaman & Rudner, 2019). While concrete cases have thus far 
been only in specific scenarios (such as individuals being involved in 
employee group chats), Facebook itself clearly sees the principle as a 
general rule for their platform. This framework, based on data transferring 
to a platform as property, completely undermines privacy as freedom. 
Treating data as property entails treating users as products, an 
objectification of the population within corporate interests. In this system it 
is not only employees but users too who are considered human resources, 
with the customer now being other corporations seeking advertisement 
and influence. 
 
We should also be wary of privacy as a branding exercise, and oppose the 
framing of privacy as a commodity (for the wealthy) that emerges from 
defining privacy as property. But even shifting ownership to users can fall 
into the protectionist dilemma. A report by the Open Data Institute recently 
concluded that “data is not capable of constituting property in the legal 
trust sense” (Reed et al., 2019, p. 12). This calls into question the legal 
basis of “data trusts” as collective alternatives to platform ownership of 
data, and raises further questions about considering privacy as property in 
a more general sense. Thinking in terms of property, and in particular its 
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protection, not only runs counter to net ideals of openness but also 
exacerbates existing inequalities. Understanding privacy in terms of 
protecting property can never be for everyone. Even within protectionist 
perspectives, framing privacy as property has limited effectiveness at best 




Beneath both freedom and property lies protecting privacy as the systemic 
protection of power in digital society. At first glance, and following the 
ideals of many involved in the early days of the internet, privacy displays a 
utopian relation to power. Privacy enables the creation of enclaves as 
alternative spaces, protected from oppressive political forces. These 
enclaves sustain a space in which alternative systems of power can 
emerge, a radical counter to the enclosure of citizens in digital spaces 
through privacy invasion (Andrejevic, 2009). In this sense privacy creates 
spaces for political desire, and protecting privacy becomes a source of 
empowerment. But entwined with informational power as control over 
access to knowledge/resources in digital society, privacy is part of the 
increasing “reality construction” by algorithmic governance (Just & Latzer, 
2017). While privacy can act as a check on this use of data, as we have 
seen there are few legitimate protections that genuinely support groups 
and individuals marginalised by existing powers. 
 
If technical tools are available, so the argument goes, the onus is on 
individuals having the power to protect their own privacy, leading to 
collective responsibility. But this focus risks inadvertently detracting from 
the responsibility of tech companies and governments, and is hardly fair 
on users considering the extent to which contemporary society is designed 
to manufacture participation at the expense of privacy. Emphasising the 
protection of power risks falling back on the complicity models prevalent in 
surveillance studies and privacy culture (Monahan, 2018). Privacy is not 
empowering if it involves exclusion from social reality, made worse by the 
uneven distribution of privacy and lack of other options for those from 
marginalised groups (such as the obstacles to privacy for those with 
certain disabilities). 
 
Even keeping one’s privacy, particularly as a marginalised group, can lead 
to exclusion by creating data gaps: facial recognition technologies with 
intersectional (mostly race and gender) inabilities to recognise faces 
(Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Keyes, 2018); or lack of sex-disaggregated 
data leading to a host of problems in health, work, safety, and 
representation (Criado-Perez, 2019). Even within poststructural forms of 
identity, we must remember that social relations are not always voluntary 
but form within the constraints of existing systems of meaning and power 
(Losh, 2015, p. 1651; Hoffmann, 2018a, p. 11). In light of this, if privacy is 
9
Benjamin: From protecting to performing privacy




a system of power it is one that will always, one way or the other, fail for 
the vast majority of the population. 
 
Power exists asymmetrically in all aspects of society, and the ultimate 
power—power over who lives or dies (Mbembe, 2003, p. 11)—is therefore 
embedded throughout social relations. In defining this power of 
necropolitics, Mbembe asserts that “death and freedom are irrevocably 
interwoven” (p. 38), but also that death can take various material and 
social forms of violence and exclusion (whether bodily, access to income 
or severance from the rights and interactions of civil society). In this 
context, socially disengaged technologies do “more than simply reflecting 
problematic social attitudes, [they] reinforce and amplify them”, a systemic 
act of cultural and symbolic violence (Hoffmann, 2018b). This “data 
violence” is a digital form of institutional prejudice that is continually and 
acutely felt by already marginalised groups such as the trans and 
nonbinary communities. The iterative performance of this violence by 
governments and platforms exacerbates the normalisation of exploitative 
data practices and asymmetric systems of control around data use. 
 
In a queer necropolitics, then, gender is pathologised in order to be 
erased, ostensibly to protect privacy—of, for example, the enforced 
suppression of pre-transition gender assignment in Iran (Shakhsari, 2014, 
p. 109)—while enacting a necropolitical power over marginalised 
communities through their quantification and exclusion. Butler warns that 
we must be wary of pathologisation in order for recognition (2015, p. 54)—
particularly for trans people and the legal status of transition, and 
particularly when it is combined with an enforced act of erasure by 
external bureaucratic apparatus. This is a trend seen all too often in the 
discriminatory classification of characteristics in machine vision datasets 
that reduce individuals to perceived gender, racial, occupational, or health 
assignments. The necropolitics of personal data extends also into the 
afterlife, particularly for intersectional issues such as the appropriation of 
the identities of murdered trans persons of colour to serve dominant 
political rhetorics (Snorton & Haritaworn, 2013). The periperformative 
context of privacy should therefore extend beyond the removal of an 
individual from that context; integrity should be maintained regardless of 
whether an individual has moved, disengaged or died. Forward integrity, 
forward privacy is a collective periperformative duty. 
 
Privacy can be used to both centralise and decentralise power. But the 
decentralisation of power does not itself mean better privacy or more 
power for individuals. Deleuze (1992) defines the society of control in 
terms of access to data, and Galloway (2004) builds on this to suggest 
protocols as the method of managing a decentralised control-based 
society. Current calls for regulation of big tech show how this has played 
out in practice, with companies able to amass power through the 
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decentralised networks of the internet. These new powers not only 
operate as loci of globalised wealth, but as controllers of access to 
platforms and services that form informational (and thereby social) reality. 
Privacy is not equal to power, but it is synonymous with how it operates in 
control society, and provides a good indicator of where power lies, 
highlighting existing inequalities and the commodification of power as the 
purview of privilege. Protecting protocological power (which, as access 
and control, runs parallel to privacy) does little for the individual as 
decentralised systems generate new forms of oppression and exploitation, 
a seeming drive towards global community underpinned by a “manifesto” 
of access to personal data that condemns users to engage (Rider & 
Wood, 2018). Corporate rhetorics of privacy—in both policies and 
marketing—can be seen primarily as tools of mass disempowerment. 
 
A protectionist standpoint makes it difficult to move on from thinking in 
terms of power over, even so far as having power over one’s data. 
Instead, privacy can be better thought of as empowerment—power to and 
power with—both individually and collectively. This framing leads towards 
a more performative and collaborative approach, and positions privacy as 
a means of protecting other rights, such as freedom of assembly (Privacy 
International, 2019). But protections around privacy also give platforms 
“the capacity to disempower [users] at will” (Schwarz, 2019, p. 136). This 
disempowerment also occurs at a systemic and structural level, with the 
manipulation of consent through the increasing need to use data-collecting 
platforms to access key networks for health, education, social, and other 
needs. Noble (2016) highlights the need for intersectional critique of the 
way “technological ecosystems” structure “detrimental narratives” in 
service of “material disenfranchisement,” echoed by Hoffmann (2018a) in 
the need to overcome the separation of different characteristics when 
considering marginalisation and the impossibility of “uncomplicated claims 
to neutrality or objectivity” (p. 7). The protectionist view, as a reductionist 
and therefore contextually limited effort always doomed to fail, enacts a 
sense of resignation cultivated by corporate power (Draper & Turow, 
2019). This discussion has outlined how a protectionist approach to 
privacy therefore concedes a continual losing battle for many individuals. 
To reposition privacy as a positive force, and even to “protect” it, we need 





The concept of performativity from gender theory provides a useful 
framework to critique protectionist constructions of privacy and generate 
positive collective performance (and thereby societal identity construction) 
of privacy beyond and against the failed liberal idea of the Enlightenment 
individual subject. Queer performative sociology allows us to broaden “an 
11
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understanding of power to include identity formations as well as other 
discursive formations” and “treating the construction of intersectional 
subjectivities as both performed and performative” (Valocchi, 2005, p. 
766). This approach promotes diversity and equality through emphasising 
action and process rather than a state that obtains (to use legal 
terminology) or needs protecting. Butler’s (1988) conception of 
performativity is instructive in critiquing and mobilising the individual-
collective relation of creating and entrenching constructed norms and roles 
around which privacy and power accumulate. 
 
The first step of performative privacy is emphasising the link between 
individual and collective structures. As Butler writes: 
 
The personal is thus implicitly political inasmuch as it is conditioned by shared 
social structures, but the personal has also been immunized against political 
challenge to the extent that public/private distinctions endure. (Butler, 1988, pp. 
522–3) 
 
Privacy is often thought of as protecting the individual, but in so doing it is 
always already political and collective, part of a constructed social relation 
of access/control based on the fundamental division of self and other 
(Altman, 1975, p. 50, 1977, p. 67). Petronio (2002) attempts to push this 
further by taking a more metaphorical and dynamic approach, but remains 
focused on the construction of boundaries as the definition of the self. A 
critical performative perspective therefore begins by challenging this 
assumption, removing the public/private divide and envisioning privacy in 
terms of a relational and contextual identity that is performed together. 
Privacy does not disappear in public, it is performed in, through and with 
publics and public spaces. Sedgwick (2003, p. 75) builds on Butler and 
follows Derrida with thinking the performative as being self-referential 
based in a historical (past and future) force beyond itself, but adds that we 
must also consider the periperformative, an alloreferential occurring 
temporally around a performative act to affirm or challenge it. The 
periperformative is the context of a performative act—its social-relational 
metadata—and the collective contribution to the performative utterance. In 
the terms of Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity, the norms of privacy are 
performative while contexts are periperformative. 
 
A periperformative framing highlights the blurred boundary between the 
individual, group or abstract entity, bridging personal and political 
narratives. Periperformatives therefore “allude to explicit performative 
utterances,” they describe or even negate the performative, they are 
“about performatives” rather than being an act in themselves, “they cluster 
around them” but with “no very fixed circumference” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 
68). Periperformatives acknowledge the assumed ‘they’ bearing witness to 
a performative act, the collective component of privacy that situates and 
supports an individual’s agency through collective enforcement. This can 
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be used positively or negatively, to reinforce unequal power structures or 
to enact radical change. 
 
Performativity was used by Butler to critique social and individual 
repetitions of fixed roles and identities, and this self-referential feedback 
loop of identification and subjectification (notably in gender but also in the 
wider categorisation of individuals as data) is difficult to escape. In this 
context, the legal protections of the liberal self appear as one (narrow and 
often negative) performance of perpetuating roles and constraining 
contexts that fix individuals into prescribed norms, against which a gender 
approach would require performative acts of resistance that emphasises 
the fluid incomputable aspects of the poststructural self. Sedgwick writes 
that the performative context, like a play, is “constituted as a spectacle 
that denies its audience the ability either to look away from it or equally to 
intervene in it” (2003, p. 72), and that “to disinterpellate from a 
performative scene will usually require, not another explicit performative 
nor simply the negative of one, but the nonce, referential act of a 
periperformative” (p. 70). Overcoming performative repetition of 
inequalities through critical periperformative disinterpellation of their power 
structures and social contexts is therefore a necessary step towards 
collectively performing privacy as the act of looking away, of refusing to 
accept, engage in or bear witness to forced access to or exploitation of 
data, even if that data is performed in public. What this means is using 
collective contexts to challenge the normalisation of exploitation and 
power inequality, removing the fear and risk from being in public (a 
problem that goes well beyond privacy). It is a collective act of respect that 
looks away. 
 
This is a key issue of social media: the need to individually choose and 
collectively support different audiences for different utterances without the 
exploitation of corporate or state technical-legal systems that entrench 
existing power structures. We must subvert and reappropriate the 
compulsory witness of social constructs. This entails challenging the 
assumption that a lack of privacy, for example, has become an 
unavoidable part of life in networked society. It is a challenge to the 
systemic forcing of participation in privacy-invasive platforms and 
socioeconomic structures. For example, it is refusing to share privacy-
invasive or hateful material online—or, better yet, refusing to watch or 
read such material in the first place. We must shift from complicity in fear-
based (self-)victimisation to collective performance of privacy as a positive 
social construct when combined with the periperformative disinterpellation 
of contextual integrity as an inherent part of the metadata of a speech act, 
whether online or offline. In an age where metadata and our networks or 
connections can undermine privacy even if the individual themselves is 
apparently protected, we need to build new forms of trust in societal 
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systems (Kerry, 2018), and in the integrity of social contexts, in order to 
undertake collective action and empowerment. 
 
Identity 
Beyond the reductionism of control-based society that breaks up users 
into static data points—the process of dividuation that converts individuals 
into dividuals (Deleuze, 1992) which “are then governed automatically 
through databases and levels of access and exclusion” (Whitson, 2015, p. 
343)—we must push further into the fluidity of the self, past structural 
regulation and into poststructural and relational debates as critiques of 
subjects, information, and power in order to perform privacy. Thinking of 
privacy in terms of identity is a useful framework for bridging individual and 
collective acts and perspectives, as it can be used to emphasise 
diversity—particularly the intersectional and context-specific concerns 
around the implications or empowerment of privacy—and indeed to 
support existing rights-based protections of privacy. It also extends, for 
example, Nissenbaum’s focus on appropriate flow of information to 
include, for example, bodily privacy or cyberphysical public spaces. These 
are important areas for intersectional issues in privacy and the complex 
relations between physical and digital identities. 
 
Identity stands against privacy as property. Floridi (2015a) suggests that 
we should let go of thinking about personal data in terms of the philosophy 
of economics (the property-based framework of surveillance capitalism), 
stop legislating in terms of ownership of data as a ‘thing’, and move 
towards thinking personal data in terms of the philosophy of mind. In this 
framing, my data is “mine because they constitute me” (Floridi, 2015a). 
Privacy invasions are therefore less about trespassing (imposing on 
another’s property) and more akin to kidnapping (taking another’s self). 
This maintains the privacy of personal information or memories even when 
they are acquired in a public place, for as Floridi points out, “kidnapping is 
illegal even in public spaces” (2015a). He pushes this view further in 
relation to the philosophy of memory, emphasising the right to be forgotten 
(which he insists is an unhelpful name) as being about managing, or 
‘closing’, memory: 
 
dealing with closure has become difficult on the web, a flatland lacking historical 
depth. [...] We must ensure that the right kind of personal information may be 
remembered (no removal of past information) without being constantly recalled (no 
unnecessary resurfacing of past information). (Floridi, 2015b, p. 43) 
 
This temporal closure—the act of “remembering without recalling”—can be 
understood as a collective act of periperforming the fact of remembering 
without actually performing the recalling. It acknowledges the relationality 
of access to information and supports social connections, while 
maintaining an individual’s ability to control the temporal context of their 
utterances. 
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The ahistorical entrenchment of data as a flat ontology presents a barrier 
to radical performativity. It is therefore important to think of the self not as 
singular or fixed but as fluid: “an identity tenuously constituted in time—an 
identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler, 1988, p. 
519). At first glance, data appears to run counter to performativity and to 
privacy, abstracting identity into dividual units of categorisation that stick 
inescapably with an individual across their various online interactions. But 
if we think with Butler that identity is always a stylisation, we can reinsert 
performance into data to challenge how it is operationalised by 
surveillance (state or capitalist) systems. If we understand that data is only 
ever a snapshot of one particular expression in one particular moment, we 
can begin to establish a framework for supporting privacy through time. 
 
Identity here is always plural, identified by Green in the long sociological 
tradition of treating the self and identity as multiple and fluid (2007, pp. 27-
8), working alongside and in tension with queer theory as “a radical anti-
identity politics [that] rejects a stable, knowable subject” (p. 29). We must 
therefore insert a separation, a “performative interval” which “marks the 
distance between doing and identity whereby the doing (e.g., doing 
woman) represents practice and identity (e.g., female) an interior 
semblance of self” (p. 32). Data and identities are both only ever a 
semblance, a representation, and interpretation. They are always 
relational and always suggest a separation from the individual as they 
appear within the performative context. 
 
Butler insists that we must “understand constituting acts not only as 
constituting the identity of the actor, but as constituting that identity as a 
compelling illusion, an object of belief” (1988, p. 520). Within any given 
performative context (work, family, social media, gaming) we collectively 
agree to the periperformative framework within which we sustain the 
illusion of fixed measurable identity. But if, as Butler follows de Beauvoir in 
the idea that one is never born but only becomes a woman, we assert that 
facticity (and its expression in data) is separate from cultural meaning, 
then we can start to mobilise this belief for productive performative ends. 
And is all of cyberspace not, as a cultural representation of networks and 
data, a “consensual hallucination” (Gibson, 1995 [1984], p. 67)? If so, it 
can be created to represent corporate or state interests, or recreated as a 
new stage in which the collective belief in privacy empowers users 
together. We become categories of data, and can do so as a critical 
operation in which we also become otherwise, performing across 
categories as we perform different (parts of our) identities. 
 
Beneath the performance of identification, dissolution and fuzzy 
boundaries that constitute our identities—into the importance of the 
uncountable and incomputable (Hildebrandt, 2019)—we must therefore 
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always include the performative interval between data and self as part of a 
periperformative social and spatiotemporal context, separating our fluid 
inner selves from their countable utterance as data. Athanasiou 
emphasises recognition and the act of revealing as important for trans 
people in particular (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 56). This shows the 
entwined nature of sharing and keeping secret within privacy, and the 
periperformative aspect of the appropriateness of information flow, use 
and response. This is a profoundly political project that acknowledges and 
attempts to overcome the forcing of quantified identities on individuals 
through excessive categorisation by indifferent or malicious institutions. 
 
Performing identity as privacy means being heard. It is therefore also a 
struggle against “data violence” (Hoffmann, 2018b) and the systems of 
power that convert performed identity into subjectification and oppression. 
Performing privacy as identity includes our online interactions that occur 
outside our usual ontologies: asynchronous, multiple, and apparently 
immaterial. It is thus through the act of performing identity (whether 
countable, uncountable, or relational) that we are embodied less in data 
than in metadata. Identities are always implied, always speculative, as 
they emerge from what is left out of data but suggested through metadata. 
It is therefore important to perform identity as a limit of the dissolution of 
the self, constantly recreated in the social contexts of specific relations of 
access and control, or privacy. Performing privacy invites us to embrace 
the uncountable, the fluid, and the multiple in our construction of identity. 
Performing privacy empowers greater ability to perform the self. 
 
Consent 
Alongside identity, it is fitting in thinking privacy as a performative process 
to consider consent as a driving framework for determining social 
relations. Consent has been a core component of queer privacy (Lewis, 
2017, p. 1), emphasising the everyday struggles of marginalised groups 
as well as the blurred boundaries between the many different intersecting 
populations that form global digital society. For Lewis, privacy requires 
understanding of different needs, including the different contexts in which 
one might want or need privacy, and that this in turn requires diverse 
voices in the debate: “nothing about us, without us” (p. 2). This includes 
the role of privacy in issues of domestic abuse, workplace or public 
prejudice, online dating and connected sex, as well as an integral aspect 
of sharing. Privacy as contextual integrity overcomes the constraining 
conception of access control as a limiting, secretive and protectionist 
process. 
 
Privacy always includes sharing, as long as it respects the consent of the 
relational network involved in the act of sharing and the information 
shared. While this must always be understood temporally (it is consent 
during or for a specific interaction, but also incorporates privacy in memory 
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and the right to be forgotten), taking a performative approach to the issue 
is thereby a better support even for freedom, property, and power than a 
protectionist framework. If we perform openness, we can enable 
transparency, accountability, and access to necessary information. But 
this is part of the same performance that collectively negotiates trust over 
the use of information. An example is access to sexual health advice. This 
is necessary for individuals, particularly women (and even more 
specifically, younger women or those from communities in which such 
advice may not always be available as a matter of course), in order to 
enable their autonomy and support their self-development. But the 
metadata surrounding this exchange of information (whether it is the 
contents of any discussions or the very fact of searching online for advice) 
should remain private, to enable informed autonomy and the construction 
of a supportive community. As Altman suggests, autonomy must be 
extended to the “social psychological process” of regulating interpersonal 
contact (1977, pp. 69, 83). But this too must be extended into the creation 
of collective contexts and maintaining the integrity of such social relations, 
in order to reach a notion of privacy beyond separation. 
 
The broader context is also important as part of this relational act of 
privacy, including issues of age, assault or abuse, termination, and other 
aspects that may require a performative and periperformative blurring of 
privacy to ensure relevant accountability and support without victimising 
the person seeking advice. In this example, privacy is collectively 
performed in the act of making public a request for advice (whether 
directly to another human and/or through digital platforms to connect the 
individual with the most appropriate resources) which is then collectively 
made private through the shifting of a periperformative context around the 
act (i.e. no information is stored or shared unless consented is actively 
given). In this sense, periperformativity can be considered also as the 
metadata of privacy, the always-there third-person utterance “about” the 
exchange (or not) of information that defines its collective privacy. 
 
It is certainly true that existing consent mechanisms are inadequate, 
particularly the “transparency and choice” or “notice and consent” models 
that have come under intense criticism (Nissenbaum, 2011, pp. 34-36). 
Even after steps such as GDPR, this corporately co-opted framework has 
failed to provide individuals with adequate transparency and genuine 
choice, consent as a concept forms a basis upon which to establish the 
specific contexts around which integrity would form. For Nissenbaum, it is 
the very concept of consent that is inadequate. We argue instead that 
offering true consent—rather than forcing it—can be viewed as a 
performative act that frames a context by an individual in conjunction with 
the socially periperformative context within which the information flow will 
operate. We can again return to the need to consider embodied 
experiences of marginalised groups and reassess how we can use 
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consent as an active performative framework. However, there are 
warnings against the potential trivialisation of sex ethics as a metaphor for 
data ethics (Stark & Hoffmann, 2019). Therefore, in leaning on consent 
here, we do not wish to sexualise technology, which is often used as an 
exclusionary tactic to prop up gender and racial power structures. Instead 
we aim to highlight how sex and gender (and bodies more broadly) must 
be taken into account within privacy. Doxing, revenge porn, online sexual 
threats, stalkerware and biometric data are very real concerns that show 
how the task of creating constructive periperformative privacy contexts 
must always be made in connection to existing drives towards inclusive 
and sensitive models of consent and identity. 
 
Consent is no mere metaphor but part of an interconnected and 
intersectional web of material, social, cultural and affective respect. 
Models such as the “consentful tech” project (Lee & Toliver, 2017)—which 
promotes consent as freely given, reversible, informed, enthusiastic and 
specific - can offer practical methods of performing privacy. Consent 
therefore moves towards Hoffmann’s call for a design culture of “support 
and resources” without judgement, based in “empathy and thoughtfulness” 
(2018b). Privacy as consent requires a periperformative context of respect 
that resists enforced participation and offers a genuine choice, genuine 
agency for individuals and collectives to perform without exploitation. If 
consent has failed in practice, it is because it has been built on 
protectionist notions and relegated to a condition of data use (and thereby 
misuse). Consent should form an underlying principle of privacy, an 
inherent part of the context of information. Privacy-respecting standards, 
models or presets (assuming no access rather than manipulating 
conditions for access) might offer one way of enabling a (peri)performative 
roles and relations in managing the appropriate flow of information. 
 
Rather than rights, which in privacy will invariably fall back on defensive 
terminology, consent shifts the emphasis from power over and even power 
to, which hits a protectionist limit even as a ‘positive’ right, towards a 
negotiation of the boundaries between power with and power within 
(Veneklassen & Miller, 2002, p. 55), the need for self-knowledge, 
respecting difference, and building solidarity for social transformation. As a 
performance of consent at the blurred, relational boundary between 
individuals or entities, power with forms the sharing of information (always 
in a specific and limitable spatiotemporal context) while power within 
occurs at the empowerment of control by the individual to recall consent at 
any time. This sharing and resituating of power in and between individuals 
grounds collective privacy as a mutual performance based on consent and 
respect, and its links to existing sexual politics, regulation and legal 
recourse provide a concrete framework for supporting and ensuring this 
empowerment without resting on protectionist language. 
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Comparisons are often made between Bentham and Foucault's 
panopticon and surveillance mechanisms embedded in online society. But 
these have become increasingly problematic. Tufekci (2014), among 
others, have shown that where the panopticon functions as a constantly 
visible possibility of surveillance, digital surveillance is an invisible 
constant certainty. But (as Tufekci suggested may happen in the wake of 
the Snowden revelations) the situation is more complex and indeed more 
performative. Users are aware of and concerned about the risks to their 
privacy, but this is not often embodied in their behaviour. This is the 
privacy paradox in which users know that they most certainly are being 
constantly monitored, but act as if that is not the case (Black et al., 2018), 
an oppressive social performance that underlines digital surveillance 
society. Digital surveillance has become simultaneously visible and 
invisible. 
 
Power in such a structure exists everywhere and nowhere, coalescing 
around those who control the platforms and network infrastructure. In such 
a society of control (Deleuze, 1992) or protocol (Galloway, 2004), there is 
a fundamental barrier to true consent as access is not only limited but also 
to a certain extent enforced in order to engage with social reality in digital 
society. Critical performative interventions are required to challenge this 
self-perpetuating illusion of choice. If “the performance renders social laws 
explicit” (Butler, 1988, p. 526), then we must collectively adjust our 
periperformative context in order to refuse the current system. If 
performative reality “is real only to the extent that it is performed” (p. 527), 
then it can also be performed otherwise. There is an urgent need to 
address these issues of consent in our escalating data-driven, 
cyberphysical, algorithmically governed, ‘smart’ society. 
 
Fear-based privacy has failed large swathes of the population, and a more 
positive, collective model is required. A report by the Our Data Bodies 
project on data collection in major urban areas in the US found that 
citizens have a desire for “power not paranoia” (Petty et al., 2018, p. 19) 
and “want to be seen, not watched, and heard, not harmed” (p. 22). This 
notion echoes Chun’s call for the means of being in public without being 
exploited (2016). Consent-based performative privacy moves towards 
achieving this aim, using the theatrical component to performative acts 
that designate a specific stage or arena in which acts occur and 
consequently in which the corresponding social structures emerge (Butler, 
1988, p. 527). Consent is required by both the actor(s) and audience(s), 
but should also be considered ongoing in memory (biological and 
technical), with consent (and its conditions such as the level of attribution 
or anonymisation) being able to be withdrawn at any time. This goes well 
beyond specific legal methods of withdrawal, such as the problematic 
Right to be Forgotten, into the very structure of information society. 
Privacy as consent is a complex, global, spatiotemporal relation of 
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information flow that forms social bonds through collective respect of the 




The performative act is “both that which constitutes meaning and that 
through which meaning is performed or enacted” (Butler, 1988, p. 521), 
not a matter of expressing (which suggests prior existing categories) but of 
doing (p. 528). Green suggests that “queer theory focuses on the 
performative failure—that is, the inability of the individual to fully realize 
the concept and lay claim to ontological status” (2007, p. 32). In other 
words, privacy is about becoming, not being. This is a critical-creative 
process building on two concepts of performance. The performative action 
is an introverted deconstructive speech act but is also at the same time an 
extroverted theatrical act (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 7). In this sense, performing 
privacy is a matter of agency over the division, signification and display of 
(parts of) our identities and our social realities. 
 
Butler (1988) writes of the performative as a “constituted social 
temporality” (p. 520) with possibilities for cultural transformation, formed of 
the acts of individuals, taken together, which can perform radical acts 
which question the existing structure and can thereby constitute new 
social structures (p. 523), through the power of subversive performances 
that can change the cultural field (p. 531). This is the focus of Skinner-
Thompson’s performative analysis of “anti-surveillance camouflage” that 
frames privacy “less as defensive efforts for secrecy, and more as 
affirmative acts of expression” (2017, p. 1734). These techniques 
(including masks, makeup or clothing) build on privacy as integral to 
identity. However, they also risk merely enacting “an aestheticization of 
resistance premised on individual avoidance rather than meaningful 
challenge to the violent and discriminatory logics of surveillance societies” 
(Monahan, 2015, p. 159). The performative challenge to existing power 
structures requires a periperformative desire (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 74) for 
collective action beyond the individual act. The periperformative can also 
“dramatize the pathos of uncertain agency, rather than occluding it as the 
explicit performative almost must” (p. 76). Between the performative and 
the periperformative, the act and its context(s), is a negotiation of the grey 
areas, an embracing of the diversity and even difficulty of constituting 
positive collective action. 
 
Nissenbaum attempts to demarcate separate spheres of influence for law, 
politics and social norms (2004, pp. 156–157). This is surprising given her 
emphasis on the complexities of different public/private spheres beyond 
clear-cut divisions. Similarly, her assertion that abortion should be a 
component of a full theory of privacy (which indeed it should), sits against 
her exclusion of "courtship" from regulation (victims of abuse, sexual 
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assault, or rape would beg to differ). She also places the political as only 
relevant in extreme cases of violation, which again seems entirely 
unsatisfactory to feminist and gender perspectives. While avoiding the 
legal default to regulation as a solution, Nissenbaum fails to fully integrate 
policy within politics and society. These combined methods should be 
considered within any given context. This is perhaps why Nissenbaum’s 
contextual integrity has preference for status quo (2004, pp. 144–145). As 
existing contexts are never neutral and almost never equal, this is a 
worrying starting point. While acknowledging justified change, there is the 
question of influence over norms (particularly when considering the often-
biased positions of mainstream legal and political institutions), and the 
entrenching of particular already dominant interests. A performative 
approach, by contrast, acknowledges the perpetuation of social norms (in 
a way that is sensitive to both prescriptive and descriptive definitions) but 
also provides a means for bottom-up change, representation for 
marginalised groups, and a challenge not only to the status quo but the 
systems of power that define and maintain the status quo. 
 
The first step towards privacy as social action is to generate more positive 
and more productive information cultures. Like identity, culture is always 
plural here, for there are diverse and intersectional perspectives to take 
into account when designing systems that support the privacy 
requirements of all users. Generating new cultures occupies Butler’s call 
to action: “to do, to dramatise, to reproduce”, to embody in the 
“materialising of possibilities” as a dramatic act (1988, p. 521). But in 
creating these new meanings there is also the need for “articulating 
periperformative choices that create highly charged thresholds of 
meaning” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 82) to challenge asymmetries in agency. 
We can thereby create the context in which more positive acts/social 
structures can be performed. Lewis asserts that “Queer Privacy is about 
building tools to destabilize and destroy the status quo” (2017, p. 3), 
echoing Sedgwick’s push for moving beyond the exemplary (2003, p. 79) 
by creating not single examples but a framework of tools and practices for 
constant critical creation of new social norms, an approach suited to the 
nuances of cultural diversity and specificity of marginalised groups. 
 
Performing privacy in action is to critique existing structures of data 
collection and exploitation with new utterances of identity and consent in 
socio-relational networks built on choice, agency, and respect. 
Performativity as a collective act stands from and against precarity—not 
identity—as the “rubric” that brings together intersectional marginalised 
groups (Butler, 2015, p. 58). As Murakami Wood writes, “the more 
precarious one’s conditions of existence and one’s class, racial, gender—
and so on—identity, the more that such markers become identifications, 
the result of processes of control, and less identities, the product of self-
definition” (2017, p. 45). Performing identity and privacy (including 
21
Benjamin: From protecting to performing privacy




sharing) together as a collective act of resistance therefore undermines 
the limited and discriminatory implications thrown up by thinking in terms 
of rights and property. It is, then, not identification but (embodied or, 
perhaps rather, embedded) presence that forms the collective identity of 
resistance and the performative identity as part of such collective 
resistance. This is about removing restrictions on the ability of an 
individual or group to make a performative utterance and define the 
context of such an utterance, the enabling of a position from which to 
speak (or not). It is the creation of a space for action by creating a space 
in which information norms can be questioned. This includes overcoming 
menu-driven collection and quantified identities in favour of more 
narrative, relational, and culturally embedded forms of collecting, storing, 
and using data. It is a matter of social justice, therefore, to, for example, 
replace limited dropdown menus of characteristics with qualitative and 
narrative options. This is particularly the case for gender, which if 
necessary should be an open text box rather than any given set of 
prescribed options. 
 
Better yet would be to develop temporally flexible approaches alongside a 
constant questioning of whether any particular item of data should even be 
collected in the first place. Useful here is Glissant’s (1997) mobilisation of 
opacity as a force which protects the Diverse, against “reductive 
transparency” (p. 62). It is the “real foundation of the Relation, in 
freedoms” (p. 190), the basis for solidarity with the Other (p. 193), and 
upon which transparency is imagined as part of a relation (p. 192). Blas 
(2014, 2016) further expands this concept as a basis for contemporary 
feminist and queer politics and aesthetics against the context and 
assumption of total surveillance, a resistance to the normalising and 
categorising expectations of intrusive and exclusionary social interaction. 
Beyond this critique, privacy as action is the creative process of 
generating new positive periperformative contexts through collected 





This article has presented an alternative to current protectionist 
conceptions of privacy by critiquing the prevailing and often fear-inducing 
definitions of privacy, as is seen across science, engineering, law, press, 
and media. Protectionist measures, taking privacy as access and control, 
are all too often co-opted by corporate and state actors in the society of 
control, leading to helplessness on the part of users and citizens. 
Highlighting the inherent difficulties in protecting privacy in relation to 
traditional debates of freedom, property, and power, a new way of thinking 
privacy has been proposed. In order to support privacy as an empowering 
force for equality, diversity, and inclusivity, an outline for performing 
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privacy has been detailed, building on gender theory and applying it to 
identity, consent, and action as key components of building positive 
cultures of privacy. 
 
But privacy never occurs in isolation. Issues of performing identity and 
consent in data are deeply embedded in our socio-technical relations. 
Most obviously with data science, but in the society of control this leads 
directly on to algorithmic decision-making, whether for content filters, 
targeted advertising, access to healthcare or the ethics of self-driving cars. 
Thus a related application of the framing of privacy presented here would 
be useful in, for example, performing artificial intelligence as a collective 
endeavour of trust and responsibility. We can also look to further theories 
that would inform the ongoing debate and development, such as 
Haraway’s “informatics of domination […] as a massive intensification of 
insecurity and cultural impoverishment” (1991, p. 172) as well as her 
situated knowledges and critique of partiality (1988), or Braidotti’s (2013, 
p. 38f) critical posthumanism as a relational conception of humans with 
blurred boundaries that overlap with ecological and technological 
environments. Practical creative acts of performing privacy can also be 
seen emerging in the Deep Lab collective supporting fluidity through 
“multi-pseudonymous identity” (Wagenknecht, 2014, p. 12), Gibson’s 
crypto-choreography and the performing of encryption (2018) or Blas’s 
collective queering of facial recognition and surveillance (in the works 
Facial Cages, Facial Weaponisation Suite and Contra-Internet which 
move beyond individual protection into a collective performance of identity 
as privacy). Performing privacy offers a mode of thinking that supports 
positive acts by individual users as part of a collective effort to create 
alternative social structures in which privacy can become an integral part 
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